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Since 1994 South Africa has been unable to sustainably achieve the rates of economic 
growth necessary to decrease its very high level of unemployment. Inadequate growth has 
been exacerbated by a structural increase in the share of private non-tradables (skill-
intensive) employment alongside a parallel decline in tradable (low-skill) employment. 
Against this backdrop the concept of ―The Developmental State‖ has resurfaced in policy 
discussions. The 2009 Manifesto of the African National Congress declared a ―state-led‖ 
industrial  policy  will  lead  to  the transformation  of  the  economy.  However,  there  are 
significant institutional and governance constraints that need to be overcome if ―state-
led‖ industrial policy is to succeed.  
 
1.  DEVELOPMENT OF ECONOMIC POLICY SINCE 1990 
 
1.1 GROWTH THROUGH REDISTRIBUTION 
 
THE MAIN OBJECTIVE BEHIND the development of economic policy in a newly-
democratic South Africa in the 1990‘s was to redress the apartheid legacy of high income 
inequality and abject poverty that characterised the South African economy (Nattrass, 
1992: 626). At the African National Congress (ANC) Workshop on economic policy for a 
post-apartheid South Africa (1990: 2), it was stated that the current system and its capital 
strategies would not be able to alleviate poverty and meet the needs of the majority of 
South  Africa‘s  people.  In  line  with  the  goal  of  restructuring  economic  activity  in  a 
democratic  South  Africa,  the  ANC  (1990b:  4)  ―called  for  a  programme  of  Growth 
through Redistribution, where redistribution acts as a spur to growth and where the fruits 
of growth are redistributed to satisfy basic needs.‖ This was expected to be achieved by 
increasing aggregate demand in a manner which would also result in the redistribution of 
income in favour of the poor (Moll, 1991: 314). This ―Spare Capacity‖ view assumed that 
the economy had a sizeable amount of underutilised productive capacity at its disposal 
which could be more effectively utilised by increasing aggregate demand (Moll, 1991: 
314). 
 An alternative view termed ―Restructuring Demand‖ proposed that if the structure of 
demand changed to favour the poor and meet basic needs rather than the needs of the 
wealthy minority, then a more equitable, healthier and sustainable growth path would 
materialise (Moll, 1991: 314). The change in the structure of demand would also cause the 
productive organisation of the economy to be more in line with its resources (Moll, 1991: 
314). According to Moll (1991: 314), ―the ‗Spare Capacity‘ approach, characterised the 
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unemployment  faced  by  the  South  African  economy  as  ‗Keynesian‘  unemployment.‖ 
There  was  insufficient  aggregate  demand  within  the  economy  to  generate  increased 
employment, so an increase in domestic expenditure was required to utilise the spare 
capacity.  This  would  result  in  economic  growth,  and  higher  levels  of  prosperity  and 
employment (Moll, 1991: 314).  
There existed two variations in the ―Spare Capacity‖ approach. The first one was that 
an  increase  in  government  spending  would  create  the  aggregate  demand  required  to 
increase employment and utilise the spare capacity within the economy. The alternative 
approach  (‗Demand  Restructuring‘)  for  achieving  ―growth  through  redistribution‖ 
proposed that the change takes place in the composition of aggregate demand rather than 
in  its  level  (Moll:  1991:  320).  This  view  suggests  that  moving  towards  a  more  equal 
distribution of income would boost the demand for low income goods such as food, 
clothing and housing and that all these products are produced using labour-intensive 
production processes producing an increase in employment at the same level of aggregate 
demand (Moll, 1991: 320).  
An  third  approach,  to  achieving  ―growth  through  redistribution,‖  known  as 
―restructuring supply‖ had elements of industrial strategy echoing through its proposals 
of  how  to  restructure  the  economy  to  ―expand  both  employment  creation  and  the 
production of basic consumer goods‖ (Gelb, 1990: 35). Gelb (1990: 35) argued that the 
focus  of  strategy  should  be  on  ―restructuring  the  supply-side  (production)‖  of  the 
economy  Therefore,  redistribution  should  take  place  via  investment  rather  than 
consumption  (Gelb,  1990:  35).  Investment  in  productive  capacity  would  have  to  be 
increased with the source of funds coming, mainly, from financial markets (Gelb, 1990: 
35).  
Investment in productive capacity would have to result in a shift in the composition 
of production, away from the sectors producing sophisticated consumer goods to either 
labour-intensive industries in the formal sector (food, furniture and clothing) or it should 
be shifted into services such as electricity and telephones which are infrastructural in 
nature (Gelb, 1990: 36). This would result in the ―development of the ‗informal sector‘ 
manufacturing  micro-enterprises  producing  consumer  goods,  and  expanding 
employment‖ (Gelb, 1990: 36). An important question then is how was this redistribution 
of investment going to take place and what was the state‘s role going to be? The state 
seemed  to  be  the  only  vehicle  which  could  drive  economic  development  in  a  new 
direction, however Gelb (1990: 37) states that the ―issues of the appropriate form of state 
intervention cannot be decided on general principles, but would be determined on the 
basis of strategy and policies developed on a sector-by-sector basis.‖ This strategy would 
change  the  ―nature  of  the  markets‖  from  the  reliance  on  the  market  to  generate 
autonomous responses to a ―mixed‖ market where there would be a combination of both 
―market and planning processes‖ (Gelb, 1990: 37). 
The variations of ―growth through redistribution‖ all placed great emphasis on the 
power of the state to dictate economic activity. In this respect ANC policy continued to 
echo its socialist origins in the Freedom Charter. But rather than state ownership, policy 
formulation  now  looked  increasingly  to  the  East  Asian  economic  successes  and  the 
perceived role of the state in directing this success.  
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1.2 THE RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME 
 
The ANC developed economic policy based on Reconstruction and Development for its 
1994 election campaign and its first period of government thereafter. The Reconstruction 
and Development Programme (1994: 78) outlined as its objectives, that ―Reconstruction 
and Development would be achieved through the leading and enabling role of the State, a 
thriving private sector, and active involvement by all sectors of civil society which in 
combination would lead to sustainable growth.‖ The RDP contained elements of all three 
views  of  the  South  African  economy  outlined  above,  in  that  it  tried  to  restructure 
production in favour of more labour-intensive production (housing being a key priority); 
it sought also to increase aggregate demand through enhanced public spending (excess 
capacity approach); and also to restructure demand in favour of basic goods consumed by 
the  poor.  The  key  role  of  the  state  in  economic  activity  was  only  partly  diluted  by 
acceptance of a ―mixed‖ market of public and private actors.  
All policies within the RDP were designed to alleviate income and wealth inequalities 
as well as expand productive capacity. The programmes to achieve this included ―urban 
and rural development, industrial strategy, and support for small and micro enterprise, 
job creation and land reform‖ (Reconstruction and Development Programme, 1994: 81). 
―The RDP soon became the paradigm within which all development policies were to be 
discussed - an extended wish list in which the homeless, the landless, workers, and even 
international  bankers  could  take  equal  comfort.  The ANC  focused  on  meeting  basic 
needs, eradicating poverty and investing in human capacities‖ (Visser, 2004: 7). There was 
also a major review of the country‘s welfare system, which aimed to address the injustices 
of  the  system  and  to  devise  a  welfare  strategy  that  was  compatible  with  the  new 
government‘s developmentalist commitments. South Africa‘s RDP and its White Paper 
(1995) on developmental social welfare were compatible with the social development 
approach and in line with the ANC‘s humanitarian and ―people-centred‖ values. ―While 
neo-liberal  approaches  prevailed  in  other  parts  of  the  world,  the  new  South  African 
government resurrected the social development approach and elevated it to a position of 
prominence‖ (Midgley, 2001:267). 
However, the RDP soon found itself running into trouble because according to Bond 
(2002:90), the RDP was ―fatally undermined by timid politicians, hostile bureaucrats and 
unreliable private sector partners.‖ The RDP was formulated in broad terms and did not 
provide details on how it was going to go about achieving its main objectives (Visser, 
2004: 7). Despite its commitment to ―industrial strategy‖ the RDP became increasingly 
focused  on  achieving  redistribution  through  the  Budget  to  enhance  welfare.  Actively 
boosting the supply-side of the economy, and especially labour intensive manufacturing 
aimed at producing goods for the poor, took second place to the redistributive objectives 
of fiscal spending. This was despite the fact that the country‘s failure to grow at economic 
growth rates of between 4-6 percent also made it difficult for government to generate 
funds  needed  to  implement  the  policy  objectives  (Visser,  2004:  8).  ―As  economic 
considerations began to dominate government policy in the latter half of the 1990s, the 
lofty social commitments of the RDP were given less prominence than the need for rapid 
economic growth‖ (Midgley, 2001:270). According to Visser (2004: 8), ―a final nail was 
driven into the coffin of the RDP when the new ANC government encountered its first 
major currency crisis, starting in February 1996 when the value of the rand plummeted by 
more than 25%. In order to calm domestic capital and foreign currency markets, the 4 
 
government embraced a conservative macro-economic strategy, ‗Growth, Employment 
and Redistribution‘ (GEAR)‖. 
 
 
1.3 GROWTH, EMPLOYMENT AND REDISTRIBUTION 
 
In contrast to the RDP, GEAR adopted an orthodox macroeconomic strategy which 
focused on tight monetary policy, fiscal prudence and a shift from demand-side trade 
policy  interventions  (tariffs  and  subsidies)  to  supply-side  interventions.  The  main 
objectives of fiscal policy under GEAR included the achievement of ―a tighter short term 
fiscal stance to counter inflation, an appropriate medium-term deficit target to eliminate 
government dissaving, a further revision of the tax structure, and a range of budgetary 
restructuring initiatives to sharpen the redistributive thrust of expenditure and contain 
costs‖  (GEAR,  1996:  4).  Macroeconomic  policy  was  accompanied  by  an  explicit 
recognition of the need to boost industrial output, especially output for exporting, taking 
advantage  of  the real  depreciation  of  the  Rand  exchange  rate  in  1996.  According  to 
GEAR  (1996:  4),  ―the  trade  and  industrial  policy  reforms  included  ―incorporating  a 
further lowering of tariffs to compensate for the real depreciation, the introduction of tax 
incentives for a fixed period to stimulate investment, a campaign to boost small and 
medium firm development, a strengthening of competition policy and the development 
of industrial cluster support programmes.‖ 
When evaluating the economic performance of South Africa under GEAR it is noted 
that  there  were  improvements  in  the  economic  growth  rate,  a  decline  in  the rate  of 
inflation,  a  reduction  in  the  budget  deficit  and  limited  improvements  with  regard  to 
exports and foreign capital inflows (Habib and Padayachee, 2000: 12). Where GEAR 
failed to produce results was in creating employment, which actually worsened over the 
period 1996-98, and in achieving progress in delivering social and physical infrastructure 
to the disadvantaged majority (Habib and Padayachee, 2000: 13). In the period between 
April  1994  and  the  end  of  1997  under  the  RDP  South  Africa‘s  GDP  growth  rate 
improved from 2.7% in 1994 to 3.4% in 1995 and 3.0% in 1996 and then dropped to 
1.5% in 1997 (SARB: Quarterly Bulletin, various issues). In the period after 1997 growth 
rose from 3% in 2003 to about 4% in 2005 (SARB: Quarterly Bulletin, various issues).  
These growth rates were a considerable improvement from what was experienced in the 
decade pre-1994 (1% per annum) and during the brief RDP period (3% per annum), but 
they were still not high enough to deal with South Africa‘s legacy of underdevelopment, 
poverty, unemployment and inequality (Habib and Padayachee, 2000: 11). 
 
1.4 ACCELERATED AND SHARED GROWTH INITIATIVE FOR SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 ―Conscious of the fact that growth was lackluster and that inequality was still very high, 
the  government  proposed  in  2005  the  Accelerated  and  Shared  Growth  Initiative  for 
South Africa (AsgiSA)‖ (Haussman, 2008: 3). This proposal highlighted interventions 
which the government sought to take in order to deal with the ―binding constraints‖ 
faced within the economy and was not to be seen as a shift in economic policy. AsgiSA 
did  however;  acknowledge  ―that  while  all  successful  economies  have  certain 
characteristics  in  common  such  as  well  managed  fiscal  and  monetary  policy  and 
competent  government  administration,  each  country  faces  specific  challenges  in  its 5 
 
attempt  to  move  from  mediocre  to  successful.‖  This  was  in  contrast  with  the 
―Washington Consensus‖ approach, ―which posited a fairly long list of ‗virtuous‘ actions 
which would solve any country‘s economic problems‖ (Mlambo-Ngcuka, 2006: 3).  
The  main  objective  of  AsgiSA  was  to  achieve  a  growth  rate  of  about  5  percent 
between 2004 and 2014 that would provide opportunities for labour-absorbing economic 
activities,  and  ensure  that  poverty  and  income  inequality  would  be  considerably 
decreased. 
AsgiSA‘s interventions included an infrastructure programme where government set 
to  increase  public  sector  investment,  as  well  as  develop  the  country‘s  research  and 
development infrastructure (Mlambo-Ngcuka, 2006: 4). AsgiSA identified specific sector 
strategies  aimed  at  promoting  private  sector  investment.  The  sectors  identified  were 
―labour  intensive,  rapidly  growing  sectors  worldwide,  suited  to  South  African 
circumstances,  and  open  to  opportunities  for  Broad  Based  Black  Economic 
Empowerment (BBBEE) and small business development‖ (Mlambo-Ngcuka, 2006: 6). 
The shortage of skills was identified by AsgiSA as the ―single greatest impediment‖ to 
public infrastructure and private-sector programmes and was therefore, a key area for 
government involvement (Mlambo-Ngcuka, 2006: 7). 
   
2.  THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE 
 
THAT MACROECONOMIC POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA has been conducted in a 
near exemplary manner over the past 15 years, is reflected in the fact that South Africa 
enjoys one of the lowest risk spreads of all emerging markets. While the democratically 
elected government of South Africa has introduced some innovative and costly social 
transfer  programs  to  deal  with  established  income  and  wealth  inequalities,  it  has 
undertaken  this  task  operating  within  a  framework  of  cautious  fiscal  and  monetary 
policies which have kept inflation, public debt and fiscal deficits at low levels. Also, the 
economy was significantly opened to international trade and competition as well as global 
capital flows. However, per capita GDP has grown at an average of 1.2 percent per 
annum since 1994, which has not had much of an impact on unemployment. South 
Africa‘s unemployment rate is at approximately 23.6 percent according to the narrow 
definition of unemployment (excludes discouraged workers) (Stats SA, 2009: 1) which is 
barely changed from the estimates of around 25 percent in 1993. While employment has 
increased (approximately 1.5 million jobs have been created) this has only kept pace with 
the  new  entrants  to  the  labour  force.    If  ―discouraged‖  workers  are  included  the 
expanded definition of unemployment rises to some 32.2 percent. The composition of 
unemployment  is  made  up  predominantly  by  the  young,  black  population,  who  are 
unskilled. According to Rodrik (2006: 2), ―this poor record on employment represents 
not only an economic tragedy; it poses a significant threat to the stability and eventual 
health of the South African democracy.‖     
In the light of the poor success in job creation since 1994, three (3) alternative routes 
forward  are  possible.  The  first  involves  ―fine-tuning‖  the  current  macroeconomic 
framework in order to achieve higher rates of growth and employment creation. This is 
essentially the path followed by AsgiSA. An alternative path would suggest that further 
deregulation, labour market liberalisation, privatisation and a reduced role of the state are 
necessary for faster growth and job creation. This is the route that would generally be 
supported  by  business.  A  third  alternative  is  premised  on  the  belief  that  the  desired 6 
 
outcomes are achievable only with an increased role for the state in the economy. It is 
against this last backdrop as well as the leadership changes in the ruling ANC that the 
concept of ―The Developmental State‖ has surfaced once again in the discussion of the 
future for economic policy in South Africa.  
In  South  Africa,  the  concept  of  ―The  Developmental  State‖  is  generally  used  to 
describe a state which drives development, rather than leaving it to the ―free-market‖ 
approach. The African National Congress (ANC) has declared in its 2009 Manifesto that, 
there will be a “state-led industrial policy which will lead to the transformation of the 
economy.  Adequate  resources  will  be  provided  to  strengthen  the  state-led  industrial 
policy programme, which directs public and private investment to support decent work 
outcomes,  including  employment  creation  and  broad  economic  transformation.  The 
programme will target labour-intensive production sectors and encourage activities that 
have high employment effects‖ (ANC, 2009: 12).   
 
2.1 WHAT IS THE DEVELOPMENTAL STATE? 
 
The ―developmental state‖ concept arose from the successful high growth experience of 
the industrializing states of Asia, especially Japan and Korea after 1945. According to 
Johnson (1999: 53), ―the critical element of the developmental state in Asia was not its 
economic  policy,  but  rather  its  ability  to  mobilise  the  nation  around  economic 
development within the capitalist system.‖ In terms of class structure, the developmental 
state was closely associated with business, but maintained the freedom it needed in order 
to  drive  the  development  of  new  industries  (Woo-Cumings,  1999:  22).  In  terms  of 
economic policy, the state got involved and catalysed the development of new industries, 
making  use  of  a  mixture  of  substantial  amounts  of  subsidised  credit,  strong  tariff 
protection, substantial training and infrastructure investment (Woo-Cumings, 1999: 22).  
According  to  Wade  and  Veneroso  (1998:  7),  ―high  household  savings,  plus  high 
corporate debt/equity ratios, plus bank-firm-state collaboration, plus national industrial 
strategy, plus investment incentives conditional on international competitiveness, equals 
the ‗developmental state‘.‖ For Beeson (2003: 3), ―the key is state capacity, or the ability 
to  formulate  and  implement  developmental  policies.  For  a  state  to  achieve  such  an 
outcome it not only needs a competent bureaucracy, it also needs an effective relationship 
with the domestic business class that will inevitably be at the centre of any successful 
developmental  initiatives.‖ In  order  to  achieve  this,  the  state  needs  to  be  adequately 
embedded in society so that it can put into action, through its social infrastructure, its 
goals. The state should at the same time be autonomous so that it may formulate and 
implement its objectives and policies independently of specific interests and rather act in 
the wider national interest (Beeson, 2003: 3).  
 
2.2 MANUFACTURING LED GROWTH 
 
The  South  African  economy  has  not  been  able  to  achieve  sufficiently  rapid  and 
sustainable  economic  growth  over  the  past  15  years  so  as  to  decrease  the  high 
unemployment which plagues South Africa (Rodrik, 2006: 3). One of the major causes of 
this  problem  is  the  contraction  of  the  non-mineral  tradable  sector  (including 
manufacturing)  and  the  inability  of  South  Africa  to  take  advantage  of  the  growth 
opportunities  offered  by  export-oriented  manufacturing.  This  is reflected  in  Figure  1 7 
 
below which shows the increase in total GDP, as well as the contributions to GDP of 
agriculture, mining, manufacturing and the financial sector. It is notable that the financial 
sector  rose  much  faster  than  the  overall  increase  in  GDP,  but  the  contribution  of 
agriculture, mining and manufacturing were all slower than overall GDP. This is ironic 
given the emphasis of early ANC policy thinking on restructuring the domestic economy 
in favour of labour-intensive goods demanded by the poor. 
 
Figure 1: GDP by sector (1990=100) 
 
 
It is also a contributing factor to the slow pace of employment growth, depicted in 
Figure 2. Not only has the overall GDP growth been too slow to generate the number of 
jobs  needed  to  substantially  reduce  unemployment,  but  the  composition  of  the  jobs 
created has been in favour of high skilled, low job creation sectors while low skilled, job 
intensive sectors have performed relatively poorly.  
According  to  Rodrik (2006:  4)  the manufacturing sector  is  more  intensive  in  low 
skilled labour and is the sector which displays the highest productivity in an economy.  
Accordingly, ―the expansion of non-mineral tradables— manufacturing in particular—
will be good both for growth and employment.‖ Rodrik (2006: 4).  It is in this light and 
the seeming failure of policies to date to encourage manufacturing growth that the South 
African government is now turning to a ―state-led‖ industrial strategy in order to create 
employment and spur on economic growth. An export oriented strategy that increases 
the  relative  profitability  of  manufacturing  tradables  for  global  markets  will  generate 
economic growth by  absorbing labour into productive  activities where their marginal 
product is much higher. In view of the fact that the production of durable tradable goods 
require relatively low-skilled labour in South Africa compared to service activities, which 
are high-skill intensive, that have benefited as a result of recent patterns of structural 
change, such a strategy will bring about shared growth rather than trickle-down growth 
(Rodrik, 2006: 4).  
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Figure 2: Employment by sector 
 
 
It  should  be  noted  that  support  for  this  greater  emphasis  on  manufacturing 
production  is  not  just  the  brainchild  of  the  Cosatu  leaders  that  form  an  important 
component of the new ANC leadership. It had already received support from the Panel 
of  International  Advisors  (the  ―Harvard  Group‖)  appointed  previously  by  National 
Treasury to advise government on how best to achieve the AsgiSA objectives, and of 
which  Harvard  Economists  Ricardo  Haussman  and  Dani  Rodrik  were  the  principal 
authors. While the ―Harvard Group‖ may differ from the Polokwane declarations and the 
2009 ANC election manifesto in the envisaged leadership role of the state, the objective 
of boosting manufacturing production to increase employment creation is the same. 
The pattern of structural change in South African formal employment is that there has 
been a remarkable increase in the share of private non-tradables employment with a 
parallel decline in employment within tradables. The result is a fall in the relative demand 
for low skilled labour due to the fact that the declining sectors make up the least skill 
intensive  parts  of  the  South  African  economy  (Rodrik,  2006:  8).  As  most  of  South 
Africa‘s unemployed are low skilled and there is an economy wide shortage of skilled 
workers the impact of this imbalance on employment creation is especially important.  
This  pattern  of  structural  change  sheds  some  light  on  why  the  ―skills  shortage‖  is 
continuously at the centre of South African policy discussion. The observation that skills 
inhibit economic growth is commonly held, and is echoed in the government‘s official 
policy  document  on  the  Accelerated  and  Shared  Growth  Initiative  for  South  Africa 
(ASGI-SA). Therefore, there needs to be an increase in low-skill intensive manufacturing 
at the cost of skill-intensive non-tradables in order to generate higher levels of economic 
growth and employment creation (Rodrik, 2006: 9).  
This shift in the demand for labour (particularly low-skill labour) makes it easier to 
recognise why employment creation has been disappointing and unemployment is so high 
in  South  Africa.  There  is  the  possibility  that  rising  unemployment  could  have  been 
averted by a corresponding decline in real wages for low-skilled workers. This however, 
would have been a political impossibility in view of the democratic transformation in 
South  Africa  and  the  role  played  by  unions  in  the  anti-Apartheid  struggle  and  in 
supporting the election of the new democratic government.  9 
 
In a study undertaken by Rodrik (2006: 20), it was found that the major reason for the 
decline in manufacturing employment was the decline in the relative price (profitability) 
of  manufacturing.  Skills-biased  technical  change  and  total  factor  productivity  (TFP) 
growth contribute to the fall in manufacturing employment but to a much lesser extent 
than the fall in profitability experienced in the sector (Rodrik, 2006: 20). In his study on 
the manufacturing sector in South Africa, Rodrik (2006: 22) finds that the reasons for the 
decline the manufacturing sector‘s profitability are intensified import competition and an 
appreciation  in  the  level  of  the  real  exchange  rate.  In  the  post-1994  period  the  real 
exchange rate has weakened, increasing manufacturing‘s profitability. This indicates that 
an even more depreciated real exchange rate would have been even more beneficial to the 
health  of  the  manufacturing  sector  in  South  Africa.  Rodrik  (2006:  23)  finds  that 
manufacturing‘s  profitability  is  also  strongly  connected  to  trade  competition  and 
performance. This is because ―an increase in import penetration has a strong negative 
effect on a manufacturing sub-sector‘s relative price, while an increase in exports has a 
less  strong  but  still  statistically  significant  positive  effect‖  (Rodrik,  2006:  23).  Also, 
according to Rodrik (2006: 24), ―import penetration has adverse effects on employment 
while exports have a positive effect‖ (Rodrik, 2006: 24). The outcome of the relative 
decline in profitability in the manufacturing sector is firstly that, an investor wishing to 
invest in South Africa in the period after 1994 would have rather committed resources to 
the banking, insurance and other services tailored towards the home market, than invest 
funds in the manufacturing sector (Rodrik, 2006: 20). 
The manufacturing sector needs to be the centre of any strategy wanting to achieve 
shared growth. Rodrik (2006: 25) concludes that at the macro level monetary and fiscal 
policies need to ensure that the South African Reserve Bank (SARB) is able to ―tweak‖ its 
inflation-targeting framework to allow for considerations of competitiveness to be made 
and influence its decision-making. Included here is a weaker real effective exchange rate. 
Haussman and Rodrik (2003) are sceptical about the role the state can play to enhance 
manufacturing performance in South Africa. Instead,   according to Rodrik (2006: 25), ―at 
the micro level there needs to be more coherent and better coordinated industrial policies 
targeted at ―self-discovery‖. The objective here is to encourage private investment and 
entrepreneurship  to  come up  with  new  activities  in  which  South  Africa  can  develop 
comparative advantage. In the absence of pro-active policies, such new investments do 
not necessarily materialise.‖ Rodrik (2006: 25) identifies two things which are needed to 
ensure that such a strategy will be achieved. Firstly, there needs to be greater discipline in 
targeting policy interventions on reasonable, identified sources of market failures instead 
of  on  indistinguishable,  and  economically  meaningless  objectives  (such  as  greater 
domestic ―beneficiation‖ or higher value added). Secondly, a better institutional structure 
is required to ensure ―(a) political leadership and coordination at the top and (b) strategic 
collaboration at the bottom with business and other stakeholders‖ (Rodrik, 2004). 
An  identification  of  the  type  of  ―pro-active‖  policies  at  the  micro  level  that  are 
required  in  necessitating  the  structural  change  in  the  economy  needed  to  address 
unemployment  and  poverty  is  undertaken  in  the  following  section.  The  question  of 
whether the South African government is in a position to provide the ―better institutional 
structure‖ necessary to ensure the success of the above mentioned strategy is also asked.  
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2.3 MICRO-LEVEL POLICIES 
 
Haussman  and  Rodrik  (2003:  605),  state  that  in  order  for  a  developing  country  to 
transform into a modern country it is essential that the country learns what it is good at 
producing. This process of ―self-discovery‖ is an important determinant of structural 
change, but it is also, they suggest, a process that is unlikely to be effectively provided 
under  the  free  market  system.  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that  private  firms  undertake 
investments  whose  returns  are  below  the  socially  optimal  level  needed  in  order  to 
increase the returns from these investments (Huang, 2002: 547). Thus policies at the 
micro level are required to correct for this market failure. According to Haussman and 
Rodrik (2006: 629), ―laissez-faire market actions lead to the underprovision of innovation 
and  governments  need  to  play  a  dual  role  in  fostering  industrial  growth  and 
transformation.  They  need  to  encourage  entrepreneurship  and  investment  in  new 
activities ex ante, but push out unproductive firms and sectors ex post.‖  
The role of the state in achieving manufacturing success is therefore critical, but it is a 
role in the eyes of Rodrik and Haussman (2003) that is a facilitator of private investment 
and the correction of market failures. 
The economic justification for such policies is that firms who would like to move into 
non-traditional industries in developing countries find it difficult to do so when faced 
with competition from producers in developed economies (Huang, 2002: 547). Therefore, 
according to theory, domestic firms which are protected can learn by doing and gain 
competitiveness against imports by raising productivity and by moving down the learning 
curve. According to Huang (2002: 547), ―the infant industry argument is based on a 
notion  of  ‗dynamic  comparative  advantage‘,  i.e.  nations  can  ‗create‘  comparative 
advantages away from those determined by natural endowment of factors of production 
toward  those  in  higher  profit-margin  industries  or  ones  with  greater  technological 
externalities.‖ The role of government, through initiation and implementation of these 
policies, is to accelerate this shift more rapidly than the market would otherwise make 
possible. The additional mixture of the welfare-improving industrial policy is built on the 
idea of ―big push.‖ The idea here is that singular investments are inadequate to launch 
industrialisation, because externalities associated with certain investment activities occur. 
This happens when an investment undertaken by one firm will create profits for other 
firms  by  altering the  future  composition  of  demand  or  by  producing  a  product  that 
decrease the costs of production for other firms (Huang, 2002: 548). Another reason why 
state intervention in industrial policy is advocated is because of the existence of scale 
economies -  an individual investment  can  only  become  profitable  if  a  large  share  of 
resources is invested in the sector. The role of government is to increase the private 
returns to investments equal to the social returns and/or directly organise investment 
activities across sectors so that investments are simultaneous (Huang, 2002: 548). 
The way these policies can be implemented and managed is likely to differ significantly 
from country to country, depending on administrative capability, the existing incentive 
regime, the flexibility of the fiscal system, the degree of sophistication of the financial 
sector, and the underlying political economy. Some of the policies which have been used 
to promote industrial development are mentioned below.  
In an effort to promote innovation, governments have historically used an assortment 
of instruments such as trade protection (import restrictions), public sector credit, tax 
holidays, and investment and export subsidies. The result which needs to be achieved is 11 
 
that all suitable policy interventions need to increase the expected payoff to innovation. 
However, interventions normally create other distortions. For example, if the instrument 
does not effectively differentiate between innovators and imitators, it will promote early 
entry, thus limiting the benefits to innovators while increasing the social cost of the 
intervention since imitators will get part of the resources transferred (Haussman and 
Rodrik, 2006: 629). This happens when government fails to manage the entry of firms 
into the industry and results in ‗excessive‘ entry relative to the size of the relevant markets 
and the unit costs remain high over a longer period of time. As we can see policies aimed 
at initiating the ‗self discovery‘ process can lead to rent creation. If an industry has high 
import restrictions, this makes the domestic production of importable products artificially 
more  profitable  than  other  products.  Subsidised  credit  or  budgetary  subsidies,  which 
provides risk insurance against the ‗informational‘ problem which exists in the financial 
market, makes access to financial resources easier and cheaper to firms (Huang, 2002: 
549). To deal with the excessive entry as a result of rent creation government needs to 
limit entry on economic grounds, through policies encouraging joint R&D programmes, 
arranged mergers, and direct and indirect support to business conglomeration (Huang, 
2002: 550). For such policies to be effective government needs to possess the ‗right‘ 
capacity and discipline to prohibit entry, keeping in mind that enforcement costs are quite 
high.  In  the  section  that  follows  the  institutional  and  governance  requirements  for 
effective industrial policy are discussed, as these are very demanding but are a must if 
industrial  policy  is  to  be  a  success  and  achieve  its  objectives.  If  the  institutional 
foundation  is  weak  then  the  risks  of  government  failure  and  the  wasting  of  public 
resources are considerably enhanced (Kaplan, 2007: 97). 
 
3. INSTITUTIONAL AND GOVERNANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR EFFECTIVE 
INDUSTRIAL POLICY 
 
Firstly, successful industrial policy requires coherence in terms of the goals and objectives 
set out to be achieved through industrial policy. This entails establishing clear criteria 
which are consistently applied to identify and select economic sectors or activities which 
are to be favoured or targeted (Kaplan, 2007: 97). If criteria are unclear and inconsistent 
in their application then the end result will be confusion and be a waste of time, effort 
and resources (Kaplan, 2007: 97). Secondly, there needs to be coherence in terms of the 
responsibility structure within government and its institutions to ensure that industrial 
policy is effectively administered and achieves the objectives it was intended to realize 
(Kaplan, 2007: 98). Kaplan (2007: 98) states that, ―if there are multiple sites directing and 
implementing industrial policy, both the design and implementation of industrial policy 
will  be  sub-optimal.‖  China  displayed  sub-optimal  results  in  the  1970s  and  1980s 
compared to Korea, because of its institutional framework. According to Huang (2002: 
551),  ―trade  policies  and  industry  regulations  in  China  were  dispersed  among  several 
government  agencies,  making  export  contestation  (which  needs  to  be  institutionally 
administered) harder to enforce. Also domestic competition was hampered by a weak 
central authority, which could not enforce market integration regulations effectively.‖ 
Korea on the other hand had a bureaucracy which operated under a high degree of 
autonomy, which was partly derived from its technocratic expertise but mainly from the 
high level of integration across different policy functions and the central command over 
key economic resources. This institutional context enabled the Korean regime to oblige 12 
 
firms  to  compete  within  the  global  economy,  by  facilitating  entry  restrictions  and 
promoting economies of scale in the presence of high rents (Huang, 2002: 551). Huang 
(2002: 552) states that, ―governments need to have the political and intellectual capacity 
to discipline the incumbent firms to increase scale and to impose restrictions on entry so 
that the rents created by the ‗micro level‘ policies aimed at encouraging investment in 
innovative productive activities are conferred on one or a few efficient firms.‖  
The  second  important  requirement  necessary  to  ensure  a  successful  design  and 
implementation of industrial policy is strategic collaboration. There needs to be strategic 
collaboration between government, business and other stakeholders (such as research 
institutions). This collaboration is essential because investors in developing countries are 
beleaguered  with  problems  of  asymmetric  information,  especially  regarding  the  cost 
functions of new ‗non-traditional‘ activities. This is due to the fact that such information 
cannot be determined before the investment takes place, but only after it has been made 
(Kaplan, 2007: 99). These informational failures cause economies to stay the same course 
and not expand into new  activities which have associated spillover effects. Industrial 
policy can be used to ascertain the underlying cost structure of an economy. Strategic 
collaboration  will  ensure  the  engagement  between  business  and  government  to 
understand the opportunities and constraints that face investment and the objectives set 
out by government to achieve economic development, respectively (Kaplan, 2007: 99). 
Structured information exchange between government and business therefore seeks to 
identify what barriers to diversification exist and then how to overcome these barriers 
through policy design and implementation (Rodrik, 2004: 3). In this way the process of 
determining  government  policy  is  not  a  result  of  autonomous  decision  making  by 
government. This is an important point – not telling business what to do but working 
with business towards more optimal outcomes. 
Effective industrial policy requires a strong and competent state bureaucracy (Kaplan, 
2007: 100). This point reverts back to the ‗embedded autonomy‘ discussed in the second 
section of this paper. However, as discussed above, ―embedded autonomy‖ is necessary 
but not sufficient. The developmental state also ―depends on the existence of a project 
shared by a highly developed bureaucratic apparatus with interventive capacity built on 
historical experience and a relatively organized set of private actors who can provide 
useful intelligence and a possibility of decentralized implementation‖ (Evans, 1995).  
The main aim of industrial policy is also to enhance productivity and the efficiency of 
firms,  therefore  effective  industrial  policy  needs  to  provide  for  training  and  skills 
development (Kaplan, 2007: 102). It is important here to note the differences between 
the role envisaged here for the state and that identified in the ANC election manifesto 
(2009:) of a state that ―leads‖ industrial policy, that ―directs public and private investment 
to support decent work outcomes,‖ that will ―target labour-intensive production sectors‖ 









There  are  a  number  of  governmental  policies  in  South  Africa  that  selectively  favour 
certain activities and sectors. They are not explicitly identified as industrial policy but 
display all the characteristics of industrial policy. The ‗selected and favoured‘ activities and 
sectors include the following: Direct state support to Denel in the form of subsidies for 
armaments production; support to mineral processing by subsidising infrastructure and 
energy  at  Coega  and  Richards  Bay;  direct  subsidies  are  provided  to  the  Pebble  Bed 
Modular Reactor (PBMR) for the development and production of nuclear energy plants; 
and finally the intervention in upstream fuel and chemicals production by proposing the 
‗windfall‘ tax on SASOL (this selectively disfavours investment and production in this 
area). The above mentioned policies comprise significant and very direct commitments of 
state resources towards or away from particular economic activities, notably impacting on 
the trajectory of growth and investment. They are also very research and high-technology 
intensive. The PBMR for example requires and attracts a large number of South Africa‘s 
scientists and engineers. It seems to be that government is supporting an activity in which 
the factors of production are most scarce (Kaplan, 2007: 98). The Coega development 
which aims to attract mineral processing activities (like aluminum) is extremely capital 
intensive  and  therefore  employment  creation  is  minimal.  These  choices  are  clearly 
inconsistent  with  the  objectives,  of  addressing  the  skills  shortage  and  the  high 
unemployment problem, set out in AsgiSA and the National Industrial Strategy (NIS). 
Accordingly, the OECD (2008: 12) finds that ―the emphasis on industrial policies risks 
preserving  the  apartheid-era  pattern  of  protected  national  champions  insulated  from 
foreign competition and enjoying high mark-ups. This runs counter to the acknowledged 
need to enhance the level of competition in the economy.‖ 
South  Africa  has  also  openly  targeted  the  textiles  and  motor  vehicles  and  motor 
vehicle components sectors through exporters receiving support through earning rebates 
on  imports  that  are  relative  to  their  exports.  The  Import  Rebate  Credit  Certificates 
(IRCCs) applies in respect of motor vehicles and motor vehicle components and the 
Duty Credit Certificate Scheme (DCCs) applies in respect of clothing and textiles. The 
MIDP represents industrial policy that has been successful in assisting the motor vehicles 
and  motor  vehicle  components  industry  in  becoming  globally  competitive.  However, 
international agreements by the WTO prohibit Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 
(SCM),  from  granting  subsidies  based  on  export  performance  which  is  what  South 
African industrial policy has been built on (Kaplan, 2007: 96). Such policies, which were 
applied in Korea and Taiwan, are now prohibited. Therefore, the future of industrial 
policy for an industry like motor vehicles and motor vehicle components needs to be 
designed such that support must apply to all output and enhance local content. This 
move in policy will require major increases in expenditures from the fiscus and according 
to Kaplan (2007: 97), ―a policy of support for all production whether it occurs in the 
highly competitive export market or in the protected domestic market, will be likely to 
result in less efficiency gains and make it more difficult to reward growing efficiency and 
competitiveness.‖   14 
 
The oversight and direction of these policy designs and implementation are not driven 
by the Department of Trade and Industry (dti) who should be the ministry overseeing 
industrial policy in totality. The Department of Public Enterprises administers support 
for  armaments,  the  PBMR  and  Coega,  while  the  National  Treasury  administers  and 
controls the possible windfall tax on SASOL. Even though the dti may be consulted, the 
policy is initiated and managed by other departments with their own programmes.  
The conclusion therefore is that inconsistent and inappropriate criteria are applied to 
the selection of activities that are supported by government; therefore there is lack of 
coherency in required policy goals and criteria. Secondly, there is no clear agency within 
government who directs the design and implementation of industrial policy on a whole. 
 
4.2 STRATEGIC COLLABORATION 
 
Strategic  collaboration  between  business  and  government  has  not  been  effectively 
managed and implemented to reap the benefits afforded by a successful engagement. 
There has been a structured engagement between business and government in the motor 
vehicles  and  motor  vehicle  components  industry  through  the  Motor  Industry 
Development Council. Customised Sector Programmes (CSPs) are meant to provide a 
structure  for  engagement  in  each  sector,  however  there  has  been  no  success  in  the 
implementation  of  these  mechanisms  (Kaplan,  2007:  100).  There  is  currently  a  very 
limited institutional capacity for collaboration between business and government at the 
national level. The relationship between business and government is characterised by a 
high degree of ‗mutual suspicion‘ (Kaplan, 2007: 100).  This results in detachment and 
distrust  between  the  two  parties  and  a  model  whereby  government  makes  decisions 
(often  propped  up  by  research)  and  then  consults  with  business  once  it  has  already 
decided on its policy stance.  
 
4.3 GOVERNMENTAL CAPACITY 
 
Governmental capacities in South Africa are very limited. According to Kaplan (2007: 
101), ―most of those who are currently responsible for government industrial policy are 
new recruits to their positions, who have a limited understanding of their sectors.‖ South 
Africa is not characterised by bureaucrats who are competent in the technical in-depth 
knowledge  necessary  to  devise  and  execute  significant  large-scale  interventions  and 
support for business. This view is echoed by the OECD (2008: 12) who states that ―the 
failures of government planning, coordination, and administrative capacity are recognised 
to be among the constraints holding back South Africa‘s growth performance, therefore 
the emphasis on government programmes and initiatives is at odds with this recognition.‖  
 
4.4 DISTRIBUTIONAL CONCERNS 
 
Distributional concerns in South Africa challenge the notion of identifying specific firms 
to enjoy the benefits created by rents (Kaplan, 2007: 101). The presence of Broad-based 
Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE) makes it difficult for government to support 
‗white‘ or ‗well-established‘ enterprises at the perceived expense of ‗black‘ or ‗emergent‘ 
ones. This means that industrial policy in South Africa does not only need to enhance 
growth of identified sectors or activities but also needs to provide support for ‗black-15 
 
owned‘ or ‗emergent‘ businesses within the designated activity (Kaplan, 2007: 102). This 
can weaken the impact on growth since exporting requires firms to generate economies 
of scale and a minimal scale of entry. Larger ‗white-owned‘ or ‗established‘ firms are 
inclined to have a higher export potential than smaller firms (Kaplan, 2007: 102). South 
African industrial policies are also constructed in such a way that they need to create 
employment. Therefore, incentives were redesigned such that support was conditional on 
and  proportional  to  employment  criteria.  These  types  of  incentives  reduce  their 
effectiveness as a support to investment and output because if the employment criteria 
were  not  met  then  the  incentive  could  be  withdrawn.  This  possibility  of  withdrawal 
reduces the appeal of such an incentive to investors (Kaplan, 2007: 102).  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
5. RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
From the above discussion it is evident that the Developmental State requires:  
1.  Coherence with regard to objectives and goals identified for industrial strategy 
and overall macroeconomic strategy. Industrial strategy should be implemented 
from  a  central  government  department  to  ensure  effective  administration  of 
policy prescriptions and the successful realization of policy objectives.  
2.  Strategic collaboration between government, business and other key stakeholders 
is needed, so that informational problems can be dealt with and opportunities 
and constraints within the economy can be identified. 
3.  A  strong  and  competent  state  bureaucracy  who  will  effectively  promote  and 
facilitate industrialisation.  
In light of the above analysis, there is a need for the overall custodianship of industrial 
policy to be clearly demarcated within government and for such policy to be based on a 
realistic appraisal of the resources the state possesses rather than those it aspires to. The 
principal objective of industrial policy is to raise the productivity and efficiency of firms 
(Kaplan, 2007: 104). The direction and responsibility of industrial strategy taken as a 
whole should rest with the dti as the objectives of industrial policy are one with those of 
the  dti.  Therefore,  there  is  a  need  for  capacity  building  within  the  dti  to  ensure  a 
successful  direction  of  industrial policy.  Lack  of  capacity  within  government  requires 
intervention to be facilitative rather than prescriptive. 
To  ensure  that  growth  policies  are  aimed  at  raising  firm-level  productivity  and 
efficiency Haussman (2008: 16) identifies the central role that the Industrial Development 
Corporation (IDC) has to play to achieve this.  ―The activities of the IDC should be 
focussed on the financing and incubation of activities that explore the possibilities of new 
products, new processes, new geographical zones or new forms of organization and that 
can crowd in significant additional investment through imitation and replication of the 
identified  business  model‖  (Haussman,  2008:  16).  The  IDC  should  also  consider 
particular  infrastructure  projects  that  can  address  industry-specific  needs,  such  as 
industrial  zones.  The  IDC  should  allocate  part  of  its  profits  to  funding  substantial 
exploratory and pre-investment studies. According to Haussman (2008: 16), ―the IDC 
should be evaluated not in terms of the returns it receives on old investments – it should 
not see itself as an asset management firm – but on its ability crowd in investment and 
structural transformation.‖  
In terms of the coherence of industrial policy objectives, government needs to ensure 
that the objectives set out within the policy are consistent and in line with National 16 
 
Government‘s objectives. In the 2009 Manifesto the ANC states that ―adequate resources 
will be provided to strengthen the state-led industrial policy programme, which directs 
public and private investment to support decent work outcomes, including employment 
creation and broad economic transformation. The programme will target labour-intensive 
production sectors and encourage activities that have high employment effects. It will 
include systematic support for co-operatives by way of a dedicated support institution 
and  small  business  development;  supporting  investment  in  productive  sectors;  and 
working  together  with  our  partners  in  Southern  Africa  to  invest  in  our  regional 
economy.‖  However,  the  conundrum  between  whether  labour-absorbing  productive 
activities (low skill) are creating decent jobs or is it only in the private non-tradable sector 
that  decent  work  can  be  obtained,  needs  to  be  clarified  explicitly  so  that  the 
implementation of policies are not misguided.  
Finally, in order to ensure that the limited government capacities are overcome there 
needs  to  be  a  greater  role  played  by  business.  This  is  due  to  the  fact  that  where 
government  does  not  have  the  capacity  to  identify  constraints  and  opportunities  for 
various sectors then business can play a leading role in assisting in the identification and 
policy  design  to  deal  with  these.  The  institutional  framework  by  which  the 
microeconomic  development  strategy  (MEDS)  in  the  Western  Cape  ensures  strategic 
collaboration between business and government is known as the programme of Special 
Purpose Vehicles (SPVs). According to Kaplan (2007: 107), the SPVs are represented by 
business stakeholders (members of a board) who govern the activities undertaken by the 
SPVs.  There  is  also  representation  on  the  boards  from  the  provincial,  labour  and 
academia arena. Most of the funding for the SPVs comes from government, however 
most SPVs raise funds from within their membership. The main aim of SPVs is to act as 
a sector or sub-sector development agency and encourage and facilitate collaboration 
between firms who fall within the same sector. Another objective of SPVs is to ensure 
that  there  is  discussion  between  business  and  government  on  how  government  can 
support the development of particular sectors or sub-sectors. In this way government has 
access to information that it otherwise would not have had and can now make informed 
decisions when designing and implementing industrial policy to address opportunities and 
constraints facing different sectors. SPVs also allow for feedback mechanisms between 
firms and also between business and government, as well as structured monitoring and 
evaluation of industrial policies and programmes, which will ensure that capacities are 
enhanced  and  developed.  It  is  therefore  recommended  that  national  government 
implement a programme of SPVs similar to that implemented by the microeconomic 
development strategy in the Western Cape.  
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